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Abstract
When the Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (EKRE, Estonian Conservative People’s Party) took over the defunct but exten‐
sive party organisation of the Estonian People’s Union, it placed great emphasis on rebooting and extending the organisa‐
tion and bringing in new activists. As a result, EKRE has grown into a full‐fledged mass party type of organisation with all
the characteristics associated to it. Furthermore, it has become the fastest‐growing party in Estonia in terms of member‐
ship and been notably successful in electoral terms. This article focuses primarily on the question of how EKRE developed
a mass party organisation with a strong, ideologically‐devoted activist core and a remarkable presence on the ground.
The article also demonstrates how the party offers a variety of opportunities for engagement to its members. In contrast
to an archetypical right‐wing populist party, the decision‐making power is somewhat diffused within the party, though the
party leader remains the public face and mouthpiece of the party. EKRE’s online engagement strategies have been among
the most successful in recent Estonian politics and make the party stand out. The article demonstrates that parties can
often revise as well as repurpose the features of the predecessor parties and even build defunct mainstream parties into
mass parties with a firm ideological core.
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1. Introduction
In spring 2012, the Eestimaa Rahvaliit (ERL, Estonian
People’s Union)—a by then defunct, but formerly major
party—and a minor radical right activist group, the
Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine (ENM, Estonian Nationalist
Movement), announced a merger and the creation of a
new party: the Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (EKRE,
Estonian Conservative People’s Party). In legal terms it
was simply a name change and not recognised as a true
merger (because one was a party and the other a small
movement). However, it became an alliance in which the
activists and ideological architects came from the ENM,
and organisational structure and mass membership was
inherited from the ERL. Political observers were initially
sceptical whether the combination of a rather marginal
(ENM) and a waning (ERL) political actor could achieve
electoral success. However, the combination proved to
be notably successful. In its first national election in 2015,
EKRE won 8% of the seats in parliament. In the next elec‐
tion, in 2019, EKRE obtained 18% of the seats in the
legislature and was invited to join a governing coalition
(Mölder, 2020).
According to Arter (2012, p. 109), a successor party
is born when a new party emerges after its predeces‐
sor ceases to exist and the replacement party becomes
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virtually a new political entity with a new name, changed
ideology, and renewed electoral appeal, which enables
it to fill and expand the remaining political niche. Most
importantly, the successor party inherits the human,
organisational, and financial resources from its prede‐
cessor, but seeks to develop them as a “new enter‐
prise.” EKRE fulfils all the criteria: It replaced ERL when
the latter became dysfunctional, radically redefined
the party’s ideology, partly transformed the electoral
base, and further developed the inherited party organ‐
isation on new grounds. Successor parties are rather
common among populist radical right parties (PRRPs).
For instance, the Freiheitliche Partie Österreichs (FPÖ,
Austrian Freedom Party) formed based on the Verband
der Unabhängigen (VdU, League of Independents) and
the Perussuomalainen Puolue (PS, True Finns Party)
replaced the Suomen Maaseudun Puolue (SPM, Finnish
Rural Party), to name a couple (Arter, 2012). However,
the organisational transformations of successor parties
have not been studied widely.
This article aims to analyse how the succession pro‐
cess influenced the development of EKRE’s mass party
structure. As the introduction to this thematic issue
states, the mass party model has proven to be popular
and viable among a number of parties whose ”populist
message challenges ’the political elites’ precisely for dis‐
engaging with ordinary citizens” (Albertazzi & van Kessel,
2021, p. 224). This article thus demonstrates a special
case of mass party organisation‐building among PRRPs
in Central and Eastern Europe, showing that the relevant
organisational model can also be found in the Eastern
part of the continent. Furthermore, EKRE’s case is inter‐
esting because it shows the development of amass party
structure in a successor party that partly draws from a
grassroots activist group.
This article is focused on EKRE’s party organisation
and seeks answers to two principal research questions:
To what extent and how has EKRE made an effort to
develop amass party typeorganisation? Towhat extent is
EKRE centralised in terms of key decision‐making areas?
The article will demonstrate that EKRE has devel‐
oped an extensive party organisation reminiscent of
a mass party. Even if the inherited party organisation
proved to be a useful foundation for a mass party,
the party leaders had to reboot the whole organisa‐
tion. They reinvented the party’s political programme,
brought in new activists, and created new engagement
strategies and institutional practices in order to create
a fully functional organisation. Overall, EKRE has suc‐
cessfully adopted the mass party organisational model,
and it is now the fastest‐growing party in Estonia.
Furthermore, it has also become a pioneer in online
engagement strategies, having a notably larger online
presence than other parties in Estonia. Regardless of
its leader‐centred public face, the party has devel‐
oped relatively advanced mechanisms for intra‐party
democracy. The party has multiple institutionalised and
non‐institutionalised avenues for engaging local elites,
members, and supporters into the decision‐making pro‐
cess, even if there is only anecdotal evidence of the grass‐
roots affecting the party’s policy.
The study relies primarily on secondary source ana‐
lysis (party charters, party membership lists, electoral
data, speeches and press releases, media texts, online
archives, social media pages), but also draws on 12 qual‐
itative interviews conducted with members of EKRE who
hold, or have held, positions in the party’s decision‐
making bodies or in branch‐ or district‐level leadership.
The interviewees were drawn from a diverse spectrum
of activists who varied in terms of their age, gender, and
period of party membership (see Supplementary File).
2. The Origins and Development of EKRE
EKRE is often classified as a PRRP (Mudde 2016, p. 7;
see also Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019; Kasekamp et al.,
2019; Petsinis, 2019) although, as our interviews indi‐
cate, the members prefer to see themselves as “national
conservatives.” Its ideology is based on nativism (an
anti‐Russian stance and anti‐immigration sentiments),
Euroscepticism, and the promotion of traditional family
values. One can also add anti‐liberal views (limits on indi‐
vidual freedom and an emphasis on collective national
values) and elements of populism such as anti‐elite
rhetoric and an appeal to “the people” (Braghiroli &
Petsinis, 2019; Kasekamp et al., 2019).
The ENM, which joined ERL in forming EKRE, was
a relatively small nationalistic and Eurosceptic group
(Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019) with around 300 members
(Kund, 2012). In contrast, the socially conservative and
agrarian ERL had been one of the mainstream parties
in Estonia, whose membership peaked at around 10,000
in its heyday (Toomla, 2011). ERL was founded in 2000,
when two smaller agrarian parties and a retirees’ party
merged. Its predecessors date back to the rural partic‐
ipants of the late Soviet time pro‐independence move‐
ments and the 1990s countermovement against rural
decline and neoliberal reforms. As a merger party, ERL
was initially quite diverse, but consolidated under the
broad umbrella of an agrarian‐conservative ideology
with a solidaristic and mild nationalist leaning.
ERL participated in several governments and devel‐
oped a well‐oiled patronage network that facilitated
the consolidation of its elites. This resulted in a spi‐
ral of decline after 2006 when the party faced cor‐
ruption charges. In the 2007 elections, ERL lost more
than half of its seats (from 13 to six) and moved into
opposition (Saarts, 2015). Subsequently, the party lost
almost all support it had, and many prominent members
joined other parties’ ranks. There was a failed attempt
to merge with the Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond (SDE,
Social Democratic Party of Estonia), which caused fur‐
ther tensions within the top echelons of the party and
resulted in the younger and more progressive elites leav‐
ing ERL. By the time ERL merged with the ENM, the
party mainly consisted of the elderly agrarian elite with
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broadly nationalist and social conservative orientations
and a declining and passive membership.
Even in this situation, ERL provided the main organ‐
isational foundations for the new party. It provided
the first chairman of EKRE (Margo Miljand) who served
for a year before EKRE’s long‐term leader Mart Helme
(2013–2020) took over. By that time, Mart Helme
was already a well‐known public personality in Estonia.
He had served as an ambassador in Russia in the 1990s
and had later become one of the figureheads of the
nascent Eurosceptic conservative movement in Estonia,
known for his radical public statements (see Auers &
Kasekamp, 2015). Mart Helme served as a charismatic
leader and figurehead of the party, but the party has
rarely been seen as his personal vehicle. In addition to
Mart Helme, several other people have become highly
visible and important spokespersons of the party, among
themothermembers of the Helme family: his sonMartin
Helme, who assumed party leadership in 2020, and his
wife Helle‐MoonikaHelme,who has also been part of the
party leadership.While Helle‐Moonika Helmewas a new‐
comer in politics when joining the party in 2012, Martin
Helme had already built a solid public profile as a radical
and Eurosceptic activist.
One should also not underestimate the role played
by the former Estonian president Arnold Rüütel, who had
served as a prominent member of ERL and later became
the honorary chairman of the EKRE. As he was still very
popular among the rural population, he contributed to
legitimising EKRE as a successor party of ERL (Auers &
Kasekamp, 2015, p. 145).
EKRE inherited a strong and geographically exten‐
sive party organisation from ERL, with ca. 8,000 mem‐
bers (Toomla, 2011). Thus, EKRE had a mass party type
of organisation already from the outset. However, while
ERL relied on its patronage networks and almost con‐
stant presence in government (Saarts, 2015), EKRE sig‐
nificantly strengthened the emphasis on ideology.
Few commentators (see, e.g., Auers & Kasekamp,
2013) saw potential in EKRE at that time, as many par‐
ties had already adopted an ethnonationalist agenda and
the 5%national electoral threshold is rather high for new‐
comers. The window of opportunity opened for EKRE
when Estonia adopted the Civil Partnership Act, which
legalised gender neutral partnerships in 2014 (Kasekamp
et al., 2019). Thatwas awake‐up call for themore socially
conservative segment of society, which lacked promi‐
nent spokespersons in parliamentary politics at the time.
EKRE and the Helme family were able to fill the void.
In the subsequent national elections, in March 2015, the
party obtained 8% of votes and 7% of seats in the parlia‐
ment (Table 1).
The European refugee crisis of 2015–2016 further
increased the popularity of the party. By utilising the anti‐
immigration card and anti‐establishment rhetoric, EKRE
was able to obtain 18% of the vote in the national elec‐
tions in 2019. The electoral success was further boosted
by the personal charisma of the then chairman Mart
Helme and systematic campaigning and organisation‐
building efforts (largely in the less affluent rural districts).
After the 2019 election, EKRE entered government.
The former incumbent party, Eesti Keskerakond (KE,
Estonian Centre Party) unexpectedly lost the elections,
but, in order to remain in power, and since it had few
options on the table, decided to cooperate with EKRE
(Mölder, 2020). In government, EKRE did not manage to
implement themore radical parts of its agenda (Jakobson
& Kalev, 2020). However, it was rather successful in
utilising government media briefings to maintain public
attention on their policy positions. Hoping to expand its
appeal to new electoral segments, EKRE elected a new
chairman (Martin Helme) in 2020.
3. The Efforts to Build and Maintain a Mass Party Type
of Organisation
According to Panebianco (1988) and Albertazzi (2016), a
mass party type of organisation is characterised by the
drive to recruit a large activist membership as a way
to reach out to the public, rootedness to the ground,
a well‐articulated ideology creating a distinct collective
identity, and sense of community (see also Albertazzi &
van Kessel, 2021). While EKRE’s leadership noted that
“establishing a mass party type of structure was never
a goal on its own” (Interview 10), EKRE can be said
to meet all these criteria. While it builds on ERL’s her‐
itage in terms of its structure and extent of party organ‐
isation, it has developed even further towards a mass
party structure.
While ERL was rather pragmatic and technocratic
(Saarts, 2015), EKRE describes itself as “the most ideo‐
logical party in Estonia” (Helme, 2020). EKRE has a rather
Table 1. Performance of EKRE and its predecessors in the national elections.
Year 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019
Party Electoral alliance KMÜ EME (ERL) ERL ERL ERL EKRE EKRE
Seats 41 (23*) 7 (11*) 13 6 0 7 19
Votes 174,248 35,204 64,643 39,215 12,184 46,772 99,671
Vote share 32,2 7,3 13,0 7,1 2,1 8,1 17,8
Notes: The first number is the result of the formal electoral list, the latter stands for the actual number of deputies of the ERL; KMÜ:
Koonderakond ja Maarahva Ühendus (The Coalition Party and Estonian Country People’s Party Union); EME: Eesti Maarahva Erakond
(Estonian Country People’s Party). Source: Estonian National Electoral Committee (2021).
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broad societal following and has been associated with a
wider nativist conservative movement, which has been
on the rise both internationally as well as in Estonian
society since the mid‐2010s (Kasekamp et al., 2019). ERL
was never supported by such a wider social movement,
although its predecessors were (the rural movement in
the 1990s).
After the merger, the new activists predominantly
came from the ENM’s side or from the newly recruited
members. Even if, immediately after the merger, some
former members of the ERL were still playing a relatively
active role in organisational affairs and central leader‐
ship, the newly recruited members and ENM’s activists
“soon took the lead” (Interview 10).
Currently, EKRE is the third largest, but also the
fastest‐growing party in Estonia: While the member‐
ship of the other parties has stagnated or increased at
a low pace, the membership of EKRE (along with the
Estonian Centre Party) has grown considerably (Estonian
e‐Business Register, 2021). Between 2015 and 2020,
EKRE recruited 3033 new members and most of this
growth happened naturally, without major recruitment
campaigns. To date (2021), the party has launched only
two centralised recruitment campaigns. The 2015–2016
campaign, during the refugee crisis, was not very suc‐
cessful. However, in 2021, when the party fell out of
the governing coalition, the leadership was more suc‐
cessful in sustaining momentum and gained hundreds of
new members.
It is equally noteworthy that, so far, EKRE has been
the only Estonian party to have established a party
organisation abroad (see Jakobson et al., 2020). In 2013,
conservative‐minded Estonians living in Finland founded
EKRE’s party branch there, and in 2019 another external
branch organisationwas founded in Sweden. Itwas a gen‐
uine bottom‐up initiative, which also refers to ideologi‐
cally motivated grassroots activism rather reminiscent of
a mass party.
Unlike some other PRRPs (see, e.g., Albertazzi, 2016)
and many other parties in Estonia, the party only has
full members and no supporting members, whose asso‐
ciation to the party is not made public. Also, the pro‐
cess of accepting new members is more rigorous than it
was in the ERL. New members go through background
checks—a measure that was implemented in order to
keep away “troublemakers” and avoid scandals over
members who have committed felonies (Interviews 1, 4).
Nonetheless, the party has still witnessed some pub‐
lic scandals around wayward members. Most notably,
one of the party’s candidates for minister in the cabinet
formed in spring 2019was caught driving under the influ‐
ence of alcohol and was later accused of domestic vio‐
lence. The party was forced to withdraw his candidacy
(“Kuusik accused,’’ 2019).
Additionally, applicants for party membership can
also name an endorser among party members to
boost their applications. The application procedure thus
expects active agency and some networking on behalf of
the applicants and is not designedmerely for maximising
the number of formal members.
Among EKRE’s members one can find both the new
members and those who had formerly joined with the
predecessor parties. As of January 2021 (see Figure 1),
over half of EKRE’s members had joined the party before
the 2012 rebranding—most prominently into ERL, but
some do remain members since the 1990s, i.e., from ear‐
lier periods of party succession. It is even likely thatmany













Figure 1. EKRE’s members on 1 January 2021, according to the time and legal entity they joined. Time periods for calcu‐
lating the number of members we as follows: Members who joined ERL’s predecessors (25 January 1990–6 June 2000),
ERL (10 June 2000–23 March 2012), and EKRE (24 March 2012–31 December 2020). Source: Estonian e‐Business Register
(2021).
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have not been made fully aware that they are mem‐
bers of EKRE, since inherited members have not been
required to renew their membership or pay member‐
ship fees.
EKRE has built its territorial organisation largely upon
the nation‐wide network developed by ERL, but the party
hasmade a considerable effort to re‐activate and expand
the local organisations—for instance, in his inauguration
speech, the new party chairman Martin Helme empha‐
sised the need to have a branch organisation in every sin‐
gle municipality by 2021 (Helme, 2020). In contrast to its
predecessor, EKRE has also achieved a solid presence in
larger cities. While ERL tried to penetrate the cities (e.g.,
the capital city Tallinn), it never succeeded, and the party
even failed to field a full list of candidates there (Saarts,
2015). By contrast, EKRE has founded vibrant branches in
all electoral districts of Tallinn. In the 2017 local elections,
the party compiled the third‐longest list of candidates for
local elections in Tallinn and even got six representatives
into the city council.
Regarding the party structure, EKRE initially adopted
virtually all the organisational principles of ERL, but
altered them somewhat afterward. Like all Estonian par‐
ties, EKRE’s organisational structure consists of three
levels: the local branch, the district, and central level.
A branch organisation is formed on the basis of local
election districts and needs at least five members to be
formally founded. Branch organisations have a directly
elected leadership consisting of a chair, vice‐chairs, and
a local leadership board (Party Charter of EKRE, 2016).
However, while EKRE initially adopted ERL’s organisa‐
tional model where districts overlapped with counties
(Party Charter of EKRE, 2012), the structure was soon
altered to a more functional model where party districts
follow the lines used in national elections—leaving aside
its foreign branches (Jakobson et al., 2020).
As with all Estonian parties, the highest decision‐
making body is the party congress—consisting of all
members who typically meet once a year. In the mean‐
time, decisions are taken by the board of trustees, which
convenes monthly and consists of the chairmen of the
districts (plus an extra member for every additional
300 members), 15 directly elected representatives, all
the party MPs, group representatives, honorary chairs,
and the central leadership of the party. In late 2020, the
board of trustees consisted of 87 members, the majority
of whom are representatives of districts.
Executive power is vested in the party leadership,
which consists of the party chair and three vice‐chairs.
They are assisted by the party’s leadership board, which
is directly elected at the party congress and currently con‐
sists of 11 members.
As a proper mass party, EKRE has also established a
wide array of intra‐party groups and affiliated organisa‐
tions, which attempt to strengthen the ideological devo‐
tion of the members. For instance, the party has an
active youth organisation, a women’s group, and a choir.
Organisational activities are further supplemented with
local‐level discussion clubs, regular festive events, and
extensive online engagement platforms.
While the statutory rules regarding the formation
and internal organisation of intra‐party groups have been
copied from ERL, the regulatory shell has been filled with
“notably more ideological content” (Interview 11). For
instance, the youth organisation, Blue Awakening (Sinine
Äratus), plays an important ideological role by organis‐
ing the annual Etnofutur conference, which welcomes
identitarian and far right activists across the world as
speakers, and organising the party’s annual torch march
on Estonian Independence Day, which usually attracts
over a couple of thousand participants and involves polit‐
ical speeches by the party leaders. The aesthetics of the
torch marches bear resemblance to the contemporary
torch marches of various radical and far right groups in
other countries, which have been linked to the historical
torch marches in Nazi Germany and those in the US by
the Ku Klux Klan (Korhonen, 2020). However, there has
also been a long‐lived tradition in the region in which
student sororities organize their own torch processions.
In case of EKRE the event also feeds into the sense of
community among party members and gives an impres‐
sion to the general public that the party is backed up by
a broader popular movement (Interviews 5, 10).
The Blue Awakening is ideologically further to the
right than the main party and openly associates with
organisations such as the Swedish youth organisation
Nordisk Ungdom, which have been characterised as
Nazi and right‐wing extremist. The organisation has also
served as a breeding‐ground for the new party elites.
For instance, EKRE’s representative in the European
Parliament, Jaak Madison (belonging to the Identity
and Democracy Group), has a background in the
youth organisation.
The central and district levels also organise vari‐
ous discussion events—for instance, in late 2020, the
party had a series of meetings between the party’s
headlining politicians and supporters titled “Dialogue
With the People” (Kahekõne Rahvaga). Districts organ‐
ise talks on various topics that “provoke people to think”
(Interview 8), such as nationalism, democracy, human‐
ism, etc. The party or its district organisations are also
active in organising political rallies, e.g., in support of
the Estonian language high school in the predominantly
Russian‐speaking town Kohtla‐Järve, or commemoration
ceremonies of the important events for Estonian inde‐
pendence and statehood.
The shift towards more profound ideological engage‐
ment has also been supported by the party’s activities
online. In 2015, party activists founded the “national
conservative news and opinions portal” Uued Uudised
(https://uueduudised.ee). It could be classified as polit‐
ically alternative media (Kasekamp et al., 2019), but
shows some features of hyperpartisan media. Stier et al.
(2020, p. 431) define hyperpartisan media as sources
that purport “to be news outlets while promoting a
narrow and skewed political agenda without making
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an effort toward a balanced representation of major
political issues, events or political actors.” In the sec‐
ond half of 2020, Uued Uudised drew on average
41,125 unique visitors per week (Metrix Station, 2021,
authors’ calculations for 1 June 2020–3 January 2021),
which is among the largest in the Estonian alternative
media scene. In comparison, another well‐known outlet,
conspiratorialist‐spiritual Telegram received on average
19,232 unique visitors per week over the same period.
However, it still remains modest in comparison to larger
news outlets. The most widely visited news portal Delfi
received over 1,1 million unique browser visits per week
(Gemius, 2021).
Uued Uudised provides an important component
for EKRE’s online presence, as it is the main refer‐
ence source to EKRE’s numerous social media channels.
The party has a notable social media presence. In addi‐
tion to the party’s national Facebook page, most of its
branch and district organisations have a Facebook page,
often accompanied by a closed Facebook group “for
coordinating activities with the more engaged activists”
(Interview 6). One of the party’s goals has been to
reinforce the communication capacities of the regions
(Espenberg, 2018). In addition, the party also has a
closed Facebook group, the EKRE’s Friends Club (EKRE
Sõprade Klubi), which is a discussion board for people
who are not necessarily members of the party, but align
ideologically. The groupwas initiated in September 2014,
i.e., when the Civil Partnership Act act emerged on the
political agenda. At the end of 2020, the group had
around 7500members and a notably active membership
with around 40 posts daily. At the time of writing, EKRE’s
online and social media presence exceeded other parties
in Estonia (see Figure 2).
Another important communication tool for consoli‐
dating the party’s support base and achieving a wider
public resonance has been the weekly radio show
Räägime Asjast (which broadly translates to “let’s talk
about the important thing”) on a relatively small radio
channel owned by a prominent member of the party,
TRE Radio. The show features theHelmes’ father‐son duo
analysing weekly political events. When EKRE was in gov‐
ernment, the Helmes utterances during this show gener‐
ated several scandals and controversies, some of which
reached even the international arena. For instance, Mart
Helme’s characterization of the Finnish prime minister
as a “sales girl” (“Estonian minister under fire,” 2019) or
questioning the legitimacy of Joe Biden’s presidency in
the US (O’Grady, 2020).
As demonstrated above, EKRE presents numerous
clear characteristics ofmass party organisation: a vibrant
and growing membership, a significant activist core,
an extensive party organisation, and strong impetus to
ideology. While EKRE’s leaders have never considered
the development of an extensive mass party type of
organisation as a priority on its own, it could be seen as
a pure necessity and a pragmatic choice. First, a mass
party type organisation has been a way to increase the
party’s public legitimacy. Many see EKRE as a fringe
party with an extreme ideology, and so there has been
an urgent need to demonstrate that the party has a
much wider public support and could be considered
a true “people’s party.” The “people’s party” image is
also extremely important considering the party’s pop‐
ulist ideology. Second, party membership numbers are
relatively high in Estonia (one of the highest in Central
and Eastern Europe; see Biezen et al., 2012). Since the
2000s, there has been a constant competition between
the Estonian parties over membership size. Thus, EKRE’s
leadership, whose ambition has been to become the
largest party in Estonia and to obtain the prime minister‐























Party-related Facebook pages (branches, subgroups)
Party-related Facebook groups
Figure 2. Parties’ official Facebook page likes and number of party‐related Facebook pages and groups on 12March, 2021.
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and neglect organisation‐building. Finally, one has to
consider the party’s history and the socio‐demographic
profile of its supporters. Lower‐income groups are over‐
represented in EKRE’s support base: They are usually
middle‐aged and often live in rural districts and smaller
towns (Trumm, 2018). Given these characteristics, the
traditional “party on the ground” mobilisation strategies
would work much better with them than a thin party
organisation mostly visible and active online.
4. Centralisation of Power and Internal Democracy
in EKRE
In many ways, EKRE’s image corresponds to a typi‐
cal populist party in terms of its leadership (see, e.g.,
Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016). Following Eatwell’s (2018)
theory on the charismatic leadership of PRRPs, it appears
that Mart Helme possesses many traits of a charis‐
matic leader: radical mission, personal presence, close‐
ness to the people (symbiotic hierarchy), andManichean
demonization of its opponents. During his time as
party chairman, Mart Helme frequently appealed to
the masses and gained media attention with colour‐
ful assertions. Furthermore, the hereditary element wit‐
nessed in some PRRPs (Heinisch & Mazzoleni, 2016)
is evident also in the case of EKRE, as the chairman
position passed from father Mart Helme to son Martin
Helme in an uncontested leadership election at a snap
Party Congress in the summer of 2020. PreviouslyMartin
Helme was one of the 11 members of the party’s
leadership board (the positions of vice‐chairmen were
reserved for other prominent party members), but after
the election, father Mart Helme became one of the
three vice‐chairmen. Furthermore, Mart Helme’s wife
Helle‐Moonika Helme has been an important spokesper‐
son for the party, a member of the party’s leadership
board, and vice‐chairman of the party’s parliamentary
faction since 2021. The family‐centred leadership model
described earlier is unusual even among other PRRPs in
the Baltic states (Wierenga, 2019).
The Helmes alone do not constitute the party’s lead‐
ership as such, but play a major strategic role inside
the party. The Helmes have adopted the journalistic
derogatory “two‐men‐backroom” (consisting of Martin
and Mart Helme) as a self‐legitimating discourse: they
acknowledge that the father‐son‐tandem works closely
together and have framed their close cooperation as
something highly beneficial to the party (Helme, 2020).
The party also depicts the passing of the leadership posi‐
tion from father to son in a positive sense: namely, as a
means to safeguard continuity.
Our interviews reveal that, unlike public perfor‐
mance, where leadership plays a very important role,
the decision‐making power within the party is more
dispersed. While the Helmes still feature most promi‐
nently in public, there are also other actors in the party,
who can influence the internal decision‐making process.
Consequently, there are different power‐centres within
the party beyond the “two‐men‐backroom”: the directly
elected vice‐chairmen, the board of trustees, and the
leadership board, in particular, have become the major
nerve‐centres of the party (Interviews 11, 12). Some of
these venues aremore institutionalised,while others can
influence decisionsmore on an ad hoc basis. For instance,
one of the interviewees described the ad hoc consul‐
tations in the leadership board: When Mart Helme’s
scandalous statements caused a media storm, chairper‐
sonMartin Helme discussed possible response strategies
(Interview 8).
First, EKRE has developed a significant infrastructure
for internal democracy. Unlike other Estonian parties
which generally tend to re‐elect the leadership every two
or three years (Aylott, 2014), EKRE re‐elects its represen‐
tative and executive bodies annually. Besides the annu‐
ally re‐elected party chairman and vice‐chairmen, the
party also has an elected leadership board and a board
of trustees, consisting of directly elected and locally
assigned members, which issues regular political state‐
ments and is in charge of approving decisions between
party congresses. However, the leadership board, in par‐
ticular, is generally considered the major nerve‐centre of
the party and the body for everyday strategic decision‐
making (Interviews 10, 12).
Unlike the party chairman elections, which have thus
far (2012–2020) been uncompetitive, there has been
more competition and representative alternation both
on the leadership board as well as the board of trustees.
Furthermore, annual re‐elections are also held in the
branch and district organisations.
Members can raise issues through a hierarchical pro‐
cess by bringing the issue from the local branch level
to the district level leadership, which plays a critical
role in moving these issues onto the agenda of the
board of trustees, from where input is given to the
leadership board. While this mechanism was underlined
in several interviews, there is no automatic guarantee
that every issue raised reaches to the party leadership:
It all depends on the nature of the proposal, context,
etc. The district level organisations also legitimise the
national level political process, as the MPs elected from
the district frequent the district organisation meetings
and bring news from the legislative arena.
EKRE has also developed participatory instruments
for allowing grassroots level initiatives within the party.
For instance, 1/10 of the party members can initiate
party charter amendments provided that they represent
more than one district. The district assemblies and board
of trustees are obliged to discuss the proposal before it is
voted on by the party congress (2/3 support is required
for acceptance).
The branch and district level organisations also have
notable control over the candidate selection process.
The local election candidate lists are drawn up by the
branch organisations and districts decide most of the
candidates for their electoral district in the general elec‐
tion. The leadership board can amend lists by only 1/5
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before the party congress approves the list of candidates.
However, for almost all elections, there has been at least
one fallout between the local and central leaderships
over top positions in electoral lists. For instance, when
the central leadership tried to replace the top candidate
for elections in Tartu city, it resulted in a prolonged con‐
flict within the local party branch, re‐election of the local
branch chairman, and forcing the former chairman to
leave the party (Saar, 2020). Thus, critics have seen the
candidate selection procedure and frequent intra‐party
elections as an instrument that helps leaders keep unruly
local elites in check.
Electoral manifestos are compiled by a special com‐
mittee summoned before every election for drafting the
partymanifesto. All partymembers are free to send their
proposals and ideas to the committee. Our interviews
indicate that the committee is a relatively autonomous
body, and although the party leadership can later make
some amendments to the draft manifesto, this right is
not excessively used. The manifesto is later approved by
the party congress.
However, there are also several non‐institutionalised
arenas through which members and even supporters
have been able to influence the intra‐party decision‐
making processes. For instance, one of the interviewees
described that when Mart Helme served as minister of
the interior and got involved in a serious political scan‐
dal, the chairman of the party, Martin Helme turned to
the selectedmembers of the leadership board and board
of trustees to discuss the situation and political strate‐
gies. Other interviewees have also mentioned instances
where the Helmes have changed political tack due to
internal discussions in the party regarding the appoint‐
ments of governmentministers or select policy positions.
For instance, regarding forestry policy, EKRE initially sup‐
ported a more pro‐industry policy, but when a notable
number of members yearned for a more environmental‐
ist position, the party agenda also shifted. However, it is
important to point out that such conflicts have not had
an impact on the core issues of the party.
The party leadership is also rather receptive to
the members’ and sympathisers’ feedback online, i.e.,
through the EKRE’s Friends Club Facebook group as well
as via personal accounts. For instance, in 2018, the
well‐known singer Siiri Sisask was about to join the party
ranks and run as a candidate on the invitation of the
party leadership. When she revealed that she personally
held rather liberal views on same‐sex couples, the discus‐
sions on EKRE’s Friends Club Facebook discussion board
grew ballistic. Eventually, the leadership, which was will‐
ing to ignore this fact, revised their position, and Sisask
renounced her candidacy.
Occasionally ordinary party members have had a
chance to express their opinion evenwith regard tomore
strategic matters. One of our interviewees described:
Since EKRE became a government party, the reg‐
ular online surveys started to appear in the [elec‐
tronic] mailing list of party members. As far as
I know, the feedback collected was often taken into
account while making decisions in the government.
(Interview 12)
Thus, EKRE features both institutionalised and func‐
tioning intra‐party democracy arenas as well as non‐
institutionalised channels through which they keep their
supporters engaged. While in principle these channels
can also be used for other purposes—e.g., the frequent
elections can also be used for grooming new dynamic
elite for the party as well as co‐opting dissenting local
elites—it is still fair to say that EKRE’s internal engage‐
ment mechanisms are fairly well‐developed in compari‐
son with some other Estonian parties (see Aylott, 2014).
As one of our interviewees from the leadership board
explained the evolution of power concentration in EKRE:
“It is inevitable that the party’s public face is their lead‐
ers….When the party was founded, the leader was play‐
ing a prominent role in decision making, indeed, but
nowadays there are more extensive and inclusive discus‐
sions within the party” (Interview 10).
When comparing the centralisation of power and
intra‐party democracy in EKREwith its predecessor (ERL),
one can find notable path‐dependency: Both are fairly
leader‐centred parties with a leaning towards the dif‐
fused leadership model (Jakobson et al., 2020; Saarts,
2015). However, ERL provided fewer arenas for an active
engagement for its members: There were less frequent
intra‐party elections, fewer active affiliated organisa‐
tions, and the internet engagement platforms were
relatively underdeveloped, resulting in a less vibrant
intra‐party democracy. Yet, as with the mass party type
structure in general, the responsiveness of the elites and
the frequent elections can be associated with the party’s
age, the need to maintain a dynamic activist core, and
upholding the party’s public image.
5. Conclusion
The study demonstrates that EKRE evokes all the features
of a mass party type organisation: It has a relatively large
membership‐based organisation that is rapidly expand‐
ing, a strong rootedness on the ground supported by
an extensive network of local party branches and affil‐
iated organisations, and the party has a solid core of
devoted activists who rely on a coherent and well‐
articulated ideology for constructing their distinctive col‐
lective identity. Some of these features are inherited,
which has made building up a mass party type organi‐
sation and legitimising EKRE as a major player notably
easier than it might otherwise have been. Yet, in many
respects, EKRE is an even more typical mass party than
its predecessor, particularly due to its strong ideologi‐
cal core and the ability to inspire ideological devotion
among its members. Thus, the case of EKRE conforms
with Arter’s (2012) observation that “successor parties”
never become the replicas of their predecessors, but
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 354–364 361
experience a substantial transformation and develop
new qualities of their own.
EKRE has also developed an extensive online ecosys‐
tem for promoting its ideology and engaging its mem‐
bers, and has been more successful at it than any other
party in contemporary Estonia. While the public image
of the party is quite leader‐centred, the mechanisms
for members’ engagement have become increasingly
important—even to a larger extent than other electorally
significant Estonian parties which tend to cultivate more
managerialist styles. Therefore, when it comes to power‐
centralisation EKRE is not considerably more centralised
than many other Estonian parties (see Aylott, 2014).
However, evidence of internal democracy is still rather
contradictory. While the leadership is re‐elected annu‐
ally and the vice‐chairs change over time, the elections of
party chairs tend to be uncontested. The same is evident
at the local level: Frequent local level elections and candi‐
date selection procedures are, on one hand, an indicator
of internal democracy, but on the other hand can also be
used to keep dissenting activists in check. Nevertheless,
the open and participatory system has helped the party
to build a vibrant and geographically extensive network
of activists and local elites who are well‐informed about
the central level decision‐making and have a channel for
promoting issues relevant for them.
There is no doubt that EKRE was in an advantageous
position in being able to take over the empty shell of its
predecessor (ERL), which saved the party from having to
build a mass party organisation from scratch. However,
the party put great effort into further developing and
expanding the party organisation and making it even
more compatible with the mass party type. Thus, adopt‐
ing the mass party structure is not just a sui generis
move, but a deliberate strategy into which the organisa‐
tion has invested.
In the previous sections, we highlighted three major
reasons why EKRE adopted the mass party type of organ‐
isation: (a) an aspiration to gain wider societal and polit‐
ical legitimacy as a true “people’s party” (the “populist
argument”), (b) the socio‐demographic profile of their
electorate (the voters belonging to the lower classes and
older generations living predominately outside of big
cities), and (c) competition with other parties which had
already developed extensive membership‐based party
organisations. While the first reason could be derived
from PRRP ideology (at least to some extent), the sec‐
ond is mainly based on pragmatic considerations; the
third reason purely relates to the local political context.
In Estonia, where almost all themajor parties havemade
a considerable effort to increase their membership and
extend the geographical scope of their party organisa‐
tions (see Tavits, 2013), any party with a serious ambi‐
tion to become a significant actor in Estonian politics
(and EKRE definitely has that ambition) had to act in
a similar fashion. In short, the specific political circum‐
stances and necessities largely favoured amore consider‐
able organisation‐building effort, and it should be noted
that EKRE surpassed the other parties in developing a
well‐articulated ideology and devoted activist core.
Finally, the mass party type organisation is aligned
with EKRE’s ambition to be “the most ideological party”
in Estonia. Such a goal is also facilitated by growing soci‐
etal demand in Estonia for a party espousing a nation‐
alist and socially conservative ideology. Hence, not only
the ideological devotion of its members, but also the
fact that EKRE is directly or indirectly supported by a
wider national‐conservative social movement made it
easier for the party to expand and engage with potential
supporters—in short, to adopt the mass party model.
In conclusion, EKRE serves as a good example of a
relatively new PRRP with a mass party structure, that
also puts considerable effort into party institutionalisa‐
tion and nurturing new party elites. It facilitates frequent
internal elections which attest to a significant degree of
internal democracy for a PRRP. Interestingly, the case of
EKRE demonstrates that charismatic leadership should
not be seen as an indicator of an under‐institutionalised
and personalistic power vehicle. Rather, charismatic lead‐
ership and even some hereditary features can coexist
with an articulate mass party structure. EKRE, like many
other PRRPs, has a clear preference for hierarchy over
deliberation, but they have institutionalised a system
where frequent elections facilitate moderate diversifica‐
tion of party elites and encourage the engagement of
local ones.
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